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CONSTITUTIONAL LAW-LEGISLATIVE PRIVILEGE-]FEDERAL COMMON
LAW EVIDENTIARY PRIVILEGE- STATE LEGISLATORS-The United

States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit has held that a state
legislator has no privilege under federal or state constitutions to
demand the quashing of subpoenas duces tecum issued by a federal
grand jury regarding legislative documents relevant to allegedly
criminal activities, but that a limited federal common law evidentiary privilege may be available to him.
In re GrandJury Proceedings, 563 F.2d 577 (3d Cir. 1977).
While investigating allegations of mail fraud, racketeering, and
tax evasion, a federal grand jury in the Eastern District of Pennsylvania issued subpoenas duces tecum to Pennsylvania State Senator
Henry J. Cianfrani, the Executive Director of the Pennsylvania Senate Majority Appropriations Committee, the Chief Clerk of the
Pennsylvania Senate, the auditors of the committee, and the payroll
clerk of the committee.I The subpoenas directed the parties named
to appear and produce certain documents of the Senate Majority
Appropriations Committee, including payroll records and nonpayroll committee records.2 Two days before the hearing date, counsel
for the subpoenaed parties informed the government that the witnesses would decline to produce the documents and would assert
3
grounds of certain privileges and immunities before the grand jury.
1.

Brief for Appellant "C" at 1, In re Grand Jury Proceedings, 563 F.2d 577 (3d Cir. 1977).

The relevant subpoenas duces tecum were later given the following letter designation:
Letter

Subpoenaed Party

"A"

Pennsylvania State Senator Henry J. Cianfrani

"B"

K. Paul Muench, Executive Director of Pennsylvania Senate
Majority Appropriations Committee

"C"

Thomas J. Kalman, Chief Clerk, Pennsylvania Senate

"D"

Price Waterhouse and Co., Auditors of the Committee

"E"

Angelina DiMarino, Payroll Clerk of the Committee

Id.
2. In re Grand Jury Proceedings, 563 F.2d 577, 579 (3d Cir. 1977). The subpoenas required
production of the committee budget, audits of the committee, all payroll records and nonpayroll financial records, expense account records, and all. correspondence, memoranda, and
minutes of the committee, executive or board meetings. Id.
3. The Government filed a Petition to Enforce Compliance and a Schofield Affidavit to
show that the items sought were relevant, were within the grand jury's jurisdiction, and were
not sought primarily for another purpose. See In re Grand Jury Proceedings (Schofield), 507
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Senator Cianfrani filed a motion for leave to intervene in the proceedings directing subpoenas duces tecum to the other parties, and
the Chief Clerk of the Senate moved to intervene in regard to the
subpoenas duces tecum directed to Senator Cianfrani.4 Both motions for intervention were granted in a hearing before the district

court. 5
At the subsequent proceeding to enforce the subpoenas, the district court judge held that although the speech or debate clause of
the United States Constitution was inapplicable, a common law
speech or debate privilege could be invoked by a state legislator in
federal grand jury proceedings involving state legislative activity.'
The court held that some of the documents sought by the subpoenas
duces tecum were protected by the common law privilege, but that
others were not; it suggested that the subpoenas be amended to
restrict the scope of questioning of potential grand jury witnesses to
acts which are not part of the legislative process.'
F.2d 963, 966 (3d Cir. 1975) (government must show by affidavit the relevancy of the material
sought before subpoenas duces tecum will be enforced in grand jury proceedings). The matter
was referred to a district court judge, who, pursuant to a motion by Senator Cianfrani, entered
an order impounding all pleadings to avoid any prejudice publicity might create due to the
senator's public position. 563 F.2d at 579.
4. 563 F.2d at 579. Intervention was sought by both parties in order to be permitted to
appeal. Generally, an appeal will not lie when a claim of privilege has been denied except in
cases where a witness has been held in contempt for refusing to testify before a grand jury.
See, e.g., United States v. Ryan, 402 U.S. 530 (1971) (only recourse after denial to quash
subpoenas duces tecum is to refuse to produce documents and risk contempt of court). An
intervenor, however, will be permitted by the courts to appeal when privilege is denied. The
reasoning behind this policy is that a witness will probably not risk contempt to preserve the
privilege asserted on behalf of someone else. 563 F.2d at 580. See also Nixon v. United States,
418 U.S. 683, 691 (1974) (President of the United States, by virtue of his office, permitted to
appeal subpoena duces tecum without intervening or incurring citation for contempt); United
States v. Doe, 455 F.2d 753, 756, aff'd in part, vacated in part on other grounds sub nom.
Gravel v. United States, 408 U.S. 606 (1972) (United States Senator permitted to intervene
in subpoena duces tecum issued to third parties and appeal therefore allowed).
5. 563 F.2d at 579.
6. In re Grand Jury Proceedings, Miscellaneous No. 77-241, slip op. at 32 (E.D. Pa. July
20, 1977).
7. See 563 F.2d at 580. The subpoenas as later amended ordered production of all payroll
records of persons employed by the committee, excluding records of the Senators on the
Committee and those of their staff members who did not work on the committee, and all
nonpayroll committee financial records excluding the records of any Senator on the committee except where those records were also records of the committee. The primary difference
between the original and amended subpoenas was the exclusion of the records directly concerning Senators and their staff members not on the committee. Id.
8. Id. The court also issued a protective order which read, in pertinent part:
[N]o witness before the Federal Grand Jury may be questioned about acts of any
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On appeal, by Senator Cianfrani and the Chief Clerk in their
capacity as intervenors," the Third Circuit affirmed the district
court ruling but narrowed its scope. 0 After a brief consideration of
the history and policy behind the speech or debate clause of the
United States Constitution," the court concluded that the clause
applies only to federal congressmen and not to members of state
legislatures. 2 The court also rejected the appellants' contention that
the state constitution's speech or debate clause provided the
13
claimed privilege in federal proceedings.
legislator or aide as are an intregal part of the deliberative or communicative processes
by which the legislators participate in Committee or Senate proceedings with respect
to the consideration and passage or rejection of proposed legislation or with respect to
other matters which the Constitution places within the jurisdiction of the State Senate, or about records relating to such acts.
Nor shall any witness be questioned concerning the motives and purposes behind
any legislator's legislative acts as defined above.
Id. Orders impounding the record (as protection against prejudicial publicity, see note 3 supra
and staying the proceedings pending appeal were also issued. 563 F.2d at 580. Both the
Senator and Chief Clerk filed Notices of Appeal in the district court, Brief for Appellant "A"
at 3, In re Grand Jury Proceedngs, 563 F.2d 577 (3d Cir. 1977), and the appeal was argued
on August 23, 1977, before the United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit. 563 F.2d
at 577.
9. The court asserted its jurisdiction since both appellants were appealing from their
positions as intervenors and not as individuals against whom a claim of privilege had been
denied. Id. at 580. See note 4 supra.
10. The Third Circuit affirmed the district court's decision that although a federal common law speech or debate privilege exists, it is a limited privilege which may not be extended
so as to be used by a legislator to obtain immunity from prosecution for criminal activity.
The standard which the district court had used excluded those activities of a legislator which
did not relate to the legislative policy-formulation process, In re Grand Jury Proceedings,
Miscellaneous No. 77-241, slip op. at 44 (E.D. Pa. July 20, 1977), while the Third Circuit
narrowed the standard to apply the speech or debate privilege to a legislator in those matters
"performed in a strictly legislative capacity, motivations for such action, or utterances in the
course of his legislative duties." 563 F.2d at 585. Therefore, payroll records could be subpoenaed in grand jury investigations of allegedly criminal activity. Id.
11. 563 F.2d at 580-81. See also notes 29-32 and accompanying text infra. The speech or
debate clause in pertinent part provides:
The senators and representatives . . .shall in all cases except treason, felony, and
breach of the peace, be privileged from arrest during their attendance at the session
of their respective Houses, and in going to and returning from the same; and for any
speech or debate in either House, they shall not be questioned in any other place.
U.S. CONST. art. I, § 6, cl.1.
12. 563 F.2d at 580-81. The phraseology of the federal clause limited its application to
United States Congressmen and their aides. Id. at 581.
13. 563 F.2d at 582. The relevant part of the Pennsylvania Constitution provides:
The members of the General Assembly shall in all cases, except treason, felony, violation of their oath of office, and breach of surety of the peace, be privileged from arrest
during their attendance at the sessions of their respective Houses and in going to and
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The court believed, however, that a federal common law evidentiary privilege was available under Federal Rule of Evidence 501.11
The court noted the disagreement that arose in the Seventh Circuit
over this issue in United States v. Craig,5 and found the opinion of
the panel recognizing the privilege more persuasive than the opinion
of the court en banc rejecting it."e The court admitted that the
existence of such a privilege could impede the prosecution of legislators who abuse their public trust. The policy behind the federal
speech or debate common law privilege, however, was the same as
that behind the adoption of the speech or debate clause in the
constitutions of the United States and many states. Thus, the existence of the privilege was necessary to protect conscientious legislators from being hampered in their work by vexations and timeconsuming lawsuits regarding performance of their legislative duties." The privilege, however, was viewed as a limited one. It would
not protect a legislator from being answerable for criminal activities
or other activity outside the sphere of his legislative duties, and
returning from the same; and for any speech or debate in either House they shall not
be questioned in any other place.
PA. CONST. art. 2, § 15. The appellants had asserted that the state constitution's speech or
debate clause controlled because it had been enacted before the ninth, tenth, and eleventh
amendments to the United States Constitution which made the federal laws applicable to
the states. The court rejected this contention on grounds the federal supremacy clause enabled the United States government to take jurisdiction over a state senator accused of violating federal criminal statutes. Separation of powers permitted by the state constitution's
speech or debate clause was viable only between co-equal branches of state government and
not between federal and state governments. Additionally, there was no justification for permitting state legislators to assert an immunity to prosecution under federal criminal laws
when no similar immunity existed for United States Congressmen.
14. Id. at 583. Rule 501 of the Federal Rules of Evidence states that:
Except as otherwise required by the Constitution of the United States or provided by
Act of Congress or in rules prescribed by the Supreme Court pursuant to statutory
authority, the privilege of a witness, person, government, State, or political subdivision
thereof shall be governed by the principles of the common law as they may be interpreted by the courts of the United States in the light of reason and experience. However, in civil actions and proceedings, with respect to an element of a claim or defense
as to which State law supplies the rule of decision, the privilege of a witness, person,
government, State, or political subdivision thereof shall be determined in accordance
with State law.
FED. R. EvD. 501.
15. United States v. Craig, 528 F.2d 773 (7th Cir.), rev'd en banc, 537 F.2d 957 (7th Cir.)
(state legislator accused of mail fraud and extortion permitted to claim federal common law
speech or debate privilege, but waived it by testifying voluntarily), cert. denied sub nor.
Markert v. United States, 425 U.S. 973 (1976). See note 44 and accompanying text infra.
16. 563 F.2d at 582-83.
17. Id. at 583.
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would therefore bear no similarity to immunity from criminal prosecution.'"
The court additionally rejected the appellants' argument that
since legislative action depends on aides who are paid for their work,
aides' payroll records should be within the privilege. The court determined that such an interpretation would give the privilege wider
coverage than the speech or debate clause and 'that to give such
meaning to the privilege would unnecessarily hinder criminal law
enforcement. ,9
In a separate opinion, Judge Gibbons concurred in the affirmation
of the district court's order but disagreed with the majority opinion
that there is a federal common law speech or debate privilege
against criminal prosecution of a state legislator for a federal
crime. 20 He treated much of the discussion in the majority opinion
as mere dictum, since although the majority discussed the scope of
the privilege recognized by the court below, only the scope of the
privilege not recognized by the district court was at issue.2 ' Nevertheless, it was necessary to explain his opposing viewpoint, Judge
Gibbons asserted, since the majority had gratuitously discussed its
2
views at length.1
Expressing uneasiness with the scope of the privilege delineated
by the majority, Judge Gibbons questioned whether it might be
applied to the anomalous situation in which a legislator might attempt to assert the privilege to prevent evidence from being admitted to aid in another party's defense.23 Judge Gibbons was also
18. Id. at 583-84. See Gravel v. United States, 408 U.S. 606 (1972) (United States Senator's speech or debate privilege does not extend to protection from questioning regarding how
materials were obtained or published); United States v. Brewster, 408 U.S. 501 (1972) (United
States Senator's acceptance of bribe was not part of legislative process and therefore not
privileged). The privilege would bar evidence of legislative acts, speech, or motivation from
litigious proceedings, and is thus one of nonevidentiary use rather than of nondisclosure since
legislative acts are generally public knowledge. Criminal activity is not within the realm of
legislative duty and thus evidence regarding such activity may-be introduced into evidence.
563 F.2d at 584.
19. 563 F.2d at 585.
20. Id. at 586.
21. Id.
22. Id. The majority had actually rendered an advisory opinion, Judge Gibbons argued.
Senator Cianfrani and the Chief Clerk were not even asserting privilege, but were each merely
attempting to prevent testimony and compliance with the subpoena duces tecum by the
other. Additionally, their arguments focused on records which would not be covered by
privilege if it were asserted. Thus, Gibbons maintained, the majority's remarks were wholly
gratuitous. Id.
.23.
Id.
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concerned by the fact that there was no evidence that a legislator
might be hampered in his legislative activity.2 ' He additionally
speculated whether the privilege would extend to civil suits, arguing
that in civil litigation the suppression of evidence because of privilege would prevent legislators from being held accountable for their
actions.2 5 If the privilege were, however, only to apply to criminal
cases, Judge Gibbons asserted that there would be no reason for its
existence because of the fifth amendment protection against selfincrimination.2 6 Concerned that the majority's interpretation of evidentiary privilege would lead to assertions of privilege beyond all
reasonable interpretations of the fifth amendment," Judge Gibbons
rejected the idea of a federal evidentiary privilege' as had the court
en banc in Craig.
The concept of a legislative speech or debate privilege is deeply
rooted in the histories of both England and the United States. From
the earliest days of the British Parliament, conflicts existed between
that legislative body and the disproportionately more powerful
Crown. As Parliament gained in power, it attempted to ensure its
autonomy, with actions culminating in the English Bill of Rights in
1689.2 The Bill prevented the monarch or anyone else in the country
from harrassing legislators for their lawmaking activities.0
The same concept was included in the United States Constitution
in the speech or debate clause . 31 Again, the purpose was to further
legislative autonomy and separation of powers in order to allow
24. Id. at 587.
25. Id.
26. Id. The Third Circuit had already held that a federal grand jury was entitled to
subpoena and receive pertinent records from the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania, even when
the Commonwealth had an interest in the confidentiality of the records. In re Grand Jury
Impaneled Jan. 21, 1975, 541 F.2d 373, 377 (3d Cir. 1976) (in absence of statute, no report
privilege existed to enable quashing of subpoena duces tecum requesting agreements filed
with prothonotary).
27. 563 F.2d at 587.
28. Id. at 588.
29.

CONGRESSIONAL RESEARCH SERVIcE OF THE LIBRARY OF CONGRESS, THE CONSTITUTION OF

THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA: ANALYSIS AND INTERPRETATION 117 (1972) (quoting the English
Bill of Rights, 1 W. & M., Sess. 2, c. 2).
30. Celia, The Doctrine of Legislative Privilege of Freedom of Speech and Debate: Its
Past, Present and Future as a Bar to Criminal Prosecutionsin the Court, 2 SuFoLK L. Rv.
1 (1968) [hereinafter cited as Celia]. See Veeder, Absolute Immunity in Defamation: Legislative and Executive Proceedings, 10 COLUM. L.J. 131 (1910); Reinstein & Silverglate,
Legislative Privilege and the Separationof Powers, 86 HAsv. L. Rav. 1113 (1973) [hereinafter
cited as Reinstein].
31. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 6, cl. 1. See note 11 supra.
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legislators greater independence in their lawmaking activities. Relieving legislators from accountability for such activities would theoretically allow them freedom of thought and they would be better
able to work for the good of their constituents. The clause was not
designed to further the individual purposes of the legislators but to
32
serve the interests of the citizens of the United States.
The speech or debate clause was construed very broadly at first
in order to effectuate its purpose. In an early nineteenth century
case, Coffin v. Coffin, 33 a United States Congressman was sued by
another Congressman for slander, as a result of allegations, made
while discussing the introduction of a bill, that the second Congressman was guilty of a felony. The Massachusetts Supreme Court
stated that to give full meaning to the speech or debate clause, it
had to be construed liberally; thus, a legislator should not only be
protected for his utterances on the House
floor, but for all activities
34
done in the line of his legislative duty.
Later cases decided in federal courts, including the United States
Supreme Court, adhered to the broad interpretation given to the
speech or debate clause in Coffin.35 Only by this liberal interpretation, courts agreed, could the purpose of the speech or debate clause,
as projected by the framers of the Constitution, be implemented. 6
32. Tenney v. Brandhove, 341 U.S. 367, 373 (1951) (acts of California senator privileged
because within sphere of legislative activity).
33. 4 Mass. 1, 3 Am. Dec. 189 (1808).
34. Id. at 9-10, 3 Am. Dec. at 193-94. In Coffin, however, the defendant was adjudged
guilty, since slander was not part of the congressman's legislative activities. See Cella, supra
note 30, at 20-28.
35. See Eastland v. United States Servicemen's Fund, 421 U.S. 491 (1975) (actions of
Senate subcommittee within sphere of legislative activity so privileged); United States v.
Johnson, 383 U.S. 169 (1965) (Congressman immune from prosecution for criminal activity
related to speech made in House); Tenney v. Brandhove, 341 U.S. 367 (1951) (acts of California Senator privileged because within the sphere of legislative activity); Cochran v. Couzens,
42 F.2d 783 (D.C. Cir.) (Senator had absolute privilege regarding alleged defamation uttered
on Senate floor), cert. denied, 282 U.S. 874 (1930); Kilbourn v. Thompson, 103 U.S. 168 (1880)
(sergeant-at-arms of legislature liable for damages for false imprisonment but legislators
immune).
36. This included not only activity within legislative chambers, but those activities connected with lawmaking which occurred outside the chamber walls. It also included resolutions, voting, and written reports and other activities which were within the realm of lawmaking but were not specifically speech or debate. See Carr v. Monroe Mfg. Co., 431 F.2d 384,
389 (5th Cir. 1970) (administrative records of State Employment Security Commission not
privileged), cert. denied, 400 U.S. 1000 (1971); United States v. Brewster, 408 U.S. 501 (1972)
(United States Senator's acceptance of bribe not part of legislative process and therefore not
privileged); Tenney v. Brandhove, 341 U.S. 367 (1951) (acts of California Senator privileged
because within sphere of legislative activity); Kilbourn v. Thompson, 103 U.S. 168 (1880)
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The Supreme Court, however, limited the application of the
speech or debate clause in 1972 with its decisions in Gravel v.
United States 7 and United States v. Brewsteru both indicating
that any existing privilege was an evidentiary privilege and would
not lead to an absolute immunity from prosecution. Although both
cases have been subject to criticism, 3 their holdings have since been
followed.4 0 Nevertheless, the speech or debate clause in the United
States Constitution does not apply to a state legislator.
Many states, including Pennsylvania, have speech or debate
clauses similar to the federal one in their constitutions." Several
Pennyslvania cases have held that the state's speech or debate
clause should be interpreted in the same manner as the clause in
(sergeant-at-arms of legislature liable for damages for false imprisonment but legislators
immune); Coffin v. Coffin, 4 Mass. 1, 3 Am. Dec. 189 (1808) (speech or debate clause to be
construed liberally but slander not within legislative process and therefore not privileged).
See also Reinstein, supra note 30, at 1149-57. In addition, the privilege was extended to aides
of legislators who were involved in legislative activities. Doe v. McMillan, 412 U.S. 306 (1973)
(Congressmen and their aides privileged as to subcommittee report, but Superintendent of
Documents is not); Gravel v. United States, 408 U.S. 606, 616 (1972) (United States Senator's
aide allowed to be interrogated so long as questions not directed to the senator's legislative
activities).
37. 408 U.S. 606 (1972). In Gravel, a United States Senator and his aide were issued
subpoenas by a federal grand jury inquiring into the publication of the Pentagon Papers
which had previously been read into public record. The Supreme Court held that although
the speech or debate clause was designed to ensure freedom of speech and deliberation to
federal legislators, the privilege was limited. Even though a senator could not be questioned
about his activities in committee, he could be interrogated about how he obtained materials
used and the methods used to secure publication of a committee record. His aides would only
be protected on the same matters as the senator would be.
38. 408 U.S. 501 (1972). The Brewster case concerned a United States Senator who was
charged with accepting bribes for official acts. The Court held that criminal acts were not
part of the legislative process and the legislative privilege of the speech or debate clause
therefore did not apply.
39. See Erwin, The Gravel and Brewster Cases: An Assault on Congressional
Independence, 59 VA. L. Rav. 175 (1973) [hereinafter cited as Erwin]; Reinstein, supra note
30. Arguably, the Court in Gravel made an attempt to distinguish legislative from nonlegislative activity without giving clear guidelines to be followed in the future. See Erwin, supra,
at 184; Reinstein, supra note 30, at 1149. It has also been feared that following the precedents
set by these two cases would hamper legislators irreparably in their lawmaking activity. Id.
40. Dickey v. CBS, Inc., 387 F. Supp. 1332 (E.D. Pa. 1975) (United States Representative
not permitted to quash subpoena or receive protective order to prevent him from appearing
for oral deposition where broadcasting network sued for alleged slander by Representative on
network broadcast). But see Doe v. McMillan, 412 U.S. 306 (1973) (Congressmen and their
aides privileged as to subcommittee report but Superintendent of Documents is not); Eastland v. United States Servicemen's Fund, 421 U.S. 491 (1975) (actions of Senate subcommittee within sphere of legislative activity so privileged).
41. PA. CONST. art. 2, § 15. See note 13 supra.
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the Federal Constitution since the provisions are analagous and no
basis has been found for distinguishing them. 2 Thus, applying the
federal standards expressed in Gravel and Brewster, a state legislator is constitutionally privileged only to the extent of his legislative
activities. 3 However, because of the doctrine of federal supremacy,
a state constitution's speech or debate clause is inapplicable in a
prosecution of a state legislator for a federal criminal offense, since
separation of powers may not be invoked.
Beyond the constitutionally granted privilege, there is also a viable common law speech or debate privilege, recognized by the Seventh Circuit panel in Craig," which the court in GrandJury considered and adopted. 5 Apparently afraid of potential extensions of the
privilege, however, the Seventh Circuit en banc reversed the panel
decision of Craig." The First Circuit has also chosen to construe the
42. Consumers Educ. and Protective Ass'n v. Nolan, 470 Pa. 372, 383, 368 A.2d 675, 681
(1977) (Pennsylvania speech or debate clause construed in same manner as federal); Dickey
v. CBS, Inc., 387 F. Supp. 1332, 1336 (E.D. Pa. 1975) (United States Representative not
permitted to quash subpoena or receive protective order to prevent him from appearing for
oral deposition where broadcasting network was sued for alleged slander by Representative
on network broadcast).
43 Gravel v. United States, 408 U.S. 606 (1972); United States v. Brewster, 408 U.S. 501
(1972). See notes 37-39 supra.
44. United States v. Craig, 528 F.2d 773 (7th Cir.), rev'd en banc, 537 F.2d 957 (7th Cir.),
cert. denied sub nom. Markert v. United States, 425 U.S. 973 (1976). In Craig,two members
of the Illinois House of Representatives, indicted on charges of political corruption, attempted
to invoke a legislative evidentiary privilege to prevent the introduction into evidence at their
trial the statements made by one of them under subpoena during a grand jury investigation.
528 F.2d at 774. The court panel determined that the purpose behind the constitutional
speech or debate clause was vital, id. at 779, and that the privilege should extend to state
legislators, id. at 778. Since neither the federal nor the state constitutional speech and debate
clauses applied in a federal prosecution of a state legislator, the court held that the federal
common law speech or debate privilege, as developed under Federal Rule of Evidence 501,
encompassed this type of proceeding. Id. at 776. However, in this instance, the legislator had
waived his privilege by testifying voluntarily and thus his prior statements were admissible.
Id. at 781.
In a separate opinion, subsequently adopted by the court en banc, Judge Tone expressed
his concurrence in the result, that the legislator's previous testimony should be admitted, id.,
but asserted that the evidentiary privilege should be equated with common law official
immunity, id. at 782. Since common law official immunity had not been extended to criminal
liability. The speech or debate privilege should also not apply in a criminal action against a
legislator. Id. See 8 Rur.-CAM. L.J. 550 (1977) (criticized the en banc decision in Craig for
denying application of an evidentiary privilege to a state legislator in a federal criminal
prosecution). But see 45 CiN. L. REv. 325 (1976) (evaluated the panel decision in Craig before
the en banc decision in Craig and found more merit in Judge Tone's concurrence than in the
panel opinion).
45. 563 F.2d 577, 583 (1977).
46. 537 F.2d 957 (7th Cir.), cert. denied sub nom. Markert v. United States, 425 U.S. 973
(1976).
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speech or debate privilege so narrowly as to negate its application
in any regard to a federal criminal prosecution of a state legislator
in United States v. DiCarlo.47 Both the Craig and DiCarlo courts
feared that once a federal common law evidentiary privilege was
extended to state legislators faced with criminal charges, the privilege would be applied indiscriminately to shield legislators from
being answerable for criminal activity if they could in any way
relate it to their legislative duties, and thus, in effect, grant them
immunity. Preferring to abandon the privilege altogether rather
than face the possibility of its running rampant, both courts refused
to apply a common law privilege to state legislators.
The Grand Jury court, however, expounded the more believable
view that the privilege would be self-limiting, since the courts would
interpret it in light of reason and experience, as called for by Federal
Rule of Evidence 501. Indeed, the holding of the Grand Jury court
itself proved that such limitation was possible. It construed the
evidentiary privilege narrowly, so that those documents specifically
related to legislative activity, such as correspondence and minutes
of meetings, were shielded from public scrutiny, but those related
to activities outside the lawmaking function, such as payroll records
containing purportedly incriminating material, were correctly not
protected but were required to be produced.
If the holdings in Craig and DiCarloare to be followed, the development of an important area in the federal common law evidentiary
privileges, called for in Federal Rule of Evidence 501, would be
inhibited. Instead, a balancing of interests should be made, weighing the policy for protection of lawmakers to encourage their efficient functioning against the need for the public to know the truth.41
47. 565 F.2d 802 (1st Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 98 S. Ct. 1487 (1978). A state legislator was
indicted for allegedly extorting funds from a contractor. The court did not apply legislative
privilege, reasoning that the federal common law speech or debate privilege was limited in
application, id. at 806, and that to apply it as had the GrandJury court would be to hamper
the search for truth needlessly. Id. at 806-07. The DiCarlocourt instead found merit in Judge
Gibbon's dissent. Id. at 807.
48. Carr v. Monroe Mfg. Co., 431 F.2d 384, 399 (5th Cir. 1970) (administrative records of
State Employment Security Commission not privileged information).
In most instances, a federal court is bound to follow the substantive law of the state in
which it sits. Erie R.R. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64 (1938). Rules of evidence, however, are
procedural. They varied from state to state and the differences proved to be quite confusing.
Therefore, in 1961, the Judicial Conference of the United States empowered the Supreme
Court to look into the advisability of drafting uniform rules of evidence for use in the federal
courts. It was found that such rules were both feasible and advisable. But when the Senate
and House of Representatives attempted to agree on rules regarding privilege, no agreement
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In recent cases in which other privileges have been asserted, there
has been little question that the truthseeking function of introducing evidence has prevailed.' 9 However, the speech or debate clause
of the Constitution and the privileges which it sets forth should
retain great weight.50 It is up to each court confronted with the issue
of privilege to make an evaluation and balancing of the competing
policies.
The GrandJury court made such an evaluation, and in balancing
the interests found there was room both for the public's right to
know and for legislative autonomy. The scope of privilege which the
Craig and DiCarlocourts and Judge Gibbons in his dissent in Grand
Jury feared would unreasonably expand, was actually narrowly focused by the majority to only those areas where the actions of a
legislator would be unquestionably part of his lawmaking functions;
other activites, including criminal acts, were affored no protection.
As indicated by the trilogy of Craig,DiCarlo,and GrandJury, the
area of federal common law evidentiary privilege regarding a criminal prosecution of a state legislator is uncertain. Hopefully, the
United States Supreme Court will take the opportunity to settle the
conflict in this area in which it appears that the question will continue to arise with greater frequency.
For now, the decision of the court in In re GrandJury Proceedings
upholding a federal common law evidentiary privilege seems to follow'most closely the intent of the legislators who developed Federal
Rule of Evidence 501. The policy behind the speech or debate clause
was deemed to be of such great national concern by the framers of
the United States Constitution as to merit inclusion in that important document, and this view was also espoused by the framers of
many state constitutions and by many jurists in the intervening
years. Evidentiary privilege is too important to be abolished by
judicial fiat by modern courts, especially since the courts have
power to control its application to prevent it from shielding criminal
could be reached. In order to prevent a total deadlock, a compromise was reached in which a
federal common law privilege was to be developed and used in federal cases, as called for by
Federal Rule of Evidence 501. See [19741 U.S. CODE & CONG. AD. NEws 7051.
49. Patterson v. Norfolk & Western Ry., 489 F.2d 303 (6th Cir. 1973) (evidence admitted
in federal court despite state rule of privilege); Garner v. Wolfinbarger, 430 F.2d 1093 (5th
Cir. 1970) (attorney-client privilege not absolute when protection of public interests at stake).
50. See note 44 supra (discussion of Craig). See also United States v. Mandel, 415 F.
Supp. 1025 (D. Md. 1976) (doctrine of legislative immunity, although a vital shield to legislators, does not shield executives even in lawmaking activities).
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activity. In this manner, the privilege will retain its vitality and still
serve the public by protecting legislators in their lawmaking func5
tions. '
Linda Osgood Johnston
51. Allowing the courts to decide on a case-by-case basis in this area has precedent in the
doctrine of official immunity, which is applied according to the person who attempts to invoke
immunity and the surrounding circumstances. See United States v. DiCarlo, 565 F.2d at 806.

